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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2643
___________
SHOU YUN JIN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. 094-803-216)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2013
Before: RENDELL, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2013)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________

PER CURIAM
Shou Yun Jin petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review.
Jin, a native of China, entered the United States without inspection in September
2006. He was charged as removable for entering without a valid entry document. Jin

conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he had been persecuted in the past
under China’s family planning policy and that he had a well-founded fear of persecution
based on his religion.
After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Jin not credible and denied relief.
The IJ observed that Jin’s allegations of persecution based on his Catholicism were not
supported by the State Department’s reports on country conditions and that Jin had not
mentioned any raid on his underground church until his merits hearing. The IJ pointed
out that Jin’s family continued to practice Catholicism in China without problems. Jin
appealed to the BIA.
The BIA dismissed the appeal. It noted that Jin did not challenge the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination and concluded that it was not clearly erroneous. The BIA
agreed with the IJ that one incident of a church service being disrupted did not amount to
persecution. As for Jin’s CAT claim, the BIA determined that he had not made any
meaningful arguments on appeal for that relief and had not shown he was entitled to such.
Jin filed a petition for review.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We may not reverse the BIA’s
decision unless the record evidence would compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude
that Jin had met his burden. I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). In his
brief, Jin does not dispute the lack of evidence in support of his family planning claim.
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He argues that he has demonstrated a well-found fear of future persecution based on his
religion.
Jin contends that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was clearly erroneous.
However, we do not review the adverse credibility determination for clear error. We
must uphold the adverse credibility finding unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary. Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 153 (3d Cir.
2005).
In finding Jin not credible, the IJ noted that he had not mentioned his presence at
the church raid in any of his previous statements. Jin contends that the IJ ignored
corroborating evidence that: (1) Jin’s sister was in hiding to avoid arrest for attending the
underground church; (2) fellow church members stated that conditions had worsened; and
(3) Jin’s uncle stated that local cadres wanted to arrest Jin for his participation in the
underground church. However, the IJ did discuss this evidence. She noted: (1) Jin’s
siblings are practicing Catholics and have not had any problems in China; (2) Jin’s sister
related to him that underground church members were arrested and she ran away for
several days; (3) two of Jin’s fellow church congregants had advised that their church had
been detected by the Chinese government; and (4) Jin’s uncle stated that the government
wanted to arrest Jin but that the uncle had failed to mention the raid on Jin’s church. The
IJ stated that there was no evidence that officials sought to arrest Jin at the time of the
raid or before he left China a year later. Contrary to Jin’s argument, the IJ did not ignore
his evidence.
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The BIA observed that Jin did not challenge the IJ’s adverse credibility finding
and stated that it was not persuaded that the adverse credibility finding was erroneous.
To the extent that the BIA’s statement is sufficient to consider Jin’s current challenge to
be exhausted, see Lin v. Attorney General, 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008), Jin has
not shown that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find him credible.
The BIA agreed with the IJ that Jin could not meet his burden of proof even if he
were credible. Jin argues that the BIA erred in making this determination and cites to the
State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report on China from 2008. Jin
points to a statement that unregistered believers were forced to renounce ordinations
approved by the Vatican or face punishments such as fines, loss of jobs, detentions, and
their children being barred from school. The Report stated that the officials scrutinize
and sometimes harass unregistered religious groups. However, Jin does not explain how
this would rise to the level of persecution. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191
(3d Cir. 2007) (“Abusive treatment and harassment, while always deplorable, may not
rise to the level of persecution.”) Moreover, the Report indicates that most of the
harassment is directed towards underground clergy and bishops. In light of the evidence
that Jin lived in China without incident after the church raid in May 2005 until he left
China in August 2006, and that his Catholic family members have had no problems, these
excerpts from the State Department Reports do not compel a finding that Jin has a wellfounded fear of future persecution.
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Jin also argues that he is entitled to withholding of removal for the same reasons
he is entitled to asylum. Because he has not met his burden for asylum, he also has not
met the higher standard for withholding of removal. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d
157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). Jin further contends that he is entitled to relief under the CAT.
He points to a statement in a State Department Report that underground believers were
among those held and abused in mental institutions. However, Jin has not shown that the
record compels a finding that it is more likely than not that he will be housed in such an
institution.
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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